You say early on that “The biological definition does not include intent.” and then propose the “designed” definition to get around that. But if we’re tweaking definitions anyway, why not just insert the word “intentional” before “behavio(u)r” in any of the biological definitions, and that addresses all cases, including the cuckoo.
Or is there a problem with attributing intent to nonhuman living things? I don’t think so. The host bird _intends_ to nurture its own offspring, in the sense that its tendency to care for a young bird in its nest evolved for that reason, and not because it might benefit deceptive birds of other species. The fish _intends_ to swim upstream; the bear is just in the way. Etc.
My view is not that it’s not reasonable to attribute intent to non-human animals. My position on this is similar to Dennett’s view in “The Intentional Stance.” My view instead is that intent isn’t as useful as a definitional property as design is. The justice system provides some ways to get at the issue of intent, but my view is that Biology, following Williams (“Adaptation and Natural Selection”) provides good tools to infer design, which makes design a powerful way to define adaptations, admitting of empirical inquiry. Generally, thanks for reading and for the comment! This post passed a bit under the radar 😊.
Thanks for the response! Yeah I’m catching up on earlier posts since I just found this substack recently (you keep changing blogging locations without directing readers to the next one! 😉).
Maybe it’s just a terminology issue then. I don’t see a problem with using intent as shorthand for the design definition: the fish intends to swim upstream because that’s what its muscles, fins, etc. were designed by evolution to do, AND what its mental modules for spawning behavior were designed to encourage - nothing involving benefits to bears.
I admit I haven’t read The Intentional Stance; I’m in the Wegner(/Harris/Coyne/Sapolsky) camp on the nonexistence of free will, so I wasn’t convinced by Dennett’s compatibilism in Freedom Evolves. Having concluded, therefore, that “intention” is just another link in the deterministic chain of events, that may make it easier for me to casually apply it to nonhuman animals as well as humans.
First, that’s fair regarding changing locations. For what it’s worth, I’m committed to Living Fossils indefinitely 😊. I don’t think I disagree about intention being a link in the deterministic change. I prefer design because it can be used for any trait, not just behavioral ones, so it provides a consistent epistemic perspective across traits. My sense is that the issue is going to turn on how valuable the perspective is in the context of discovery. If I had to place a bet, I’d go with design. As will all things, that could be wrong. Just to say, in your remarks, when you say “what its mental modules for spawning behavior were designed to encourage,” it seems to me that’s a design stance not an intentional one. You could have said, “that what the fish wants to do.” So in some sense maybe, as you say, we agree epistemologically and are slightly crossing semantically.
You say early on that “The biological definition does not include intent.” and then propose the “designed” definition to get around that. But if we’re tweaking definitions anyway, why not just insert the word “intentional” before “behavio(u)r” in any of the biological definitions, and that addresses all cases, including the cuckoo.
Or is there a problem with attributing intent to nonhuman living things? I don’t think so. The host bird _intends_ to nurture its own offspring, in the sense that its tendency to care for a young bird in its nest evolved for that reason, and not because it might benefit deceptive birds of other species. The fish _intends_ to swim upstream; the bear is just in the way. Etc.
My view is not that it’s not reasonable to attribute intent to non-human animals. My position on this is similar to Dennett’s view in “The Intentional Stance.” My view instead is that intent isn’t as useful as a definitional property as design is. The justice system provides some ways to get at the issue of intent, but my view is that Biology, following Williams (“Adaptation and Natural Selection”) provides good tools to infer design, which makes design a powerful way to define adaptations, admitting of empirical inquiry. Generally, thanks for reading and for the comment! This post passed a bit under the radar 😊.
Thanks for the response! Yeah I’m catching up on earlier posts since I just found this substack recently (you keep changing blogging locations without directing readers to the next one! 😉).
Maybe it’s just a terminology issue then. I don’t see a problem with using intent as shorthand for the design definition: the fish intends to swim upstream because that’s what its muscles, fins, etc. were designed by evolution to do, AND what its mental modules for spawning behavior were designed to encourage - nothing involving benefits to bears.
I admit I haven’t read The Intentional Stance; I’m in the Wegner(/Harris/Coyne/Sapolsky) camp on the nonexistence of free will, so I wasn’t convinced by Dennett’s compatibilism in Freedom Evolves. Having concluded, therefore, that “intention” is just another link in the deterministic chain of events, that may make it easier for me to casually apply it to nonhuman animals as well as humans.
First, that’s fair regarding changing locations. For what it’s worth, I’m committed to Living Fossils indefinitely 😊. I don’t think I disagree about intention being a link in the deterministic change. I prefer design because it can be used for any trait, not just behavioral ones, so it provides a consistent epistemic perspective across traits. My sense is that the issue is going to turn on how valuable the perspective is in the context of discovery. If I had to place a bet, I’d go with design. As will all things, that could be wrong. Just to say, in your remarks, when you say “what its mental modules for spawning behavior were designed to encourage,” it seems to me that’s a design stance not an intentional one. You could have said, “that what the fish wants to do.” So in some sense maybe, as you say, we agree epistemologically and are slightly crossing semantically.