Thanks for these articles. They are very insightful. I also enjoyed your book Why everyone (else) is a Hypocrite. I have read and re-read it many times. I also enjoyed the Hidden Agenda book, which greatly clarified my thinking on (US) politics. Regarding morality, my understanding is that folks like Baumard and Fitouchi say that judgements of right and wrong are really outputs of a cheater detection module. To believe that a person has acted wrongly by taking a specific action is to believe (implicitly) that by taking that action (or by not acting) the person has not kept up their end of (an implicitly-defined) bargain or violated the terms of a contract, with various types of contracts at various social scales being used to explain phenomena like double-effect or punishment meted out by the Puritans, etc (This is described in the preprint by Andre, Fitouchi, Baumard, and I take the Puritans example from your and DeScioli's response to the Fitouchi et al BBS paper.)
Intuitions of wrongness/rightness are one thing; punishment is another. The individual may punish on their own, but it's better to get others involved and if possible turn punishment into a collective action. Moralistic intuitions can serve as a coordination/focal/Schelling point around which to rally a group for this purpose. Such intuitions can solve the coordination problems attendant to turning punishment into a collective enterprise. As you argued in your papers, your and DeScioli's side-taking hypothesis, which is indeed too elegant to not be true, addresses a different selection pressure, that of avoiding even fights where basically everyone ends up losing. So, if I understand this correctly: Baumard et al are saying the moralistic intuitions are there "for free" as outputs of cheater detection (at various social scales: dyadic, coalitional,..) and separate these from the problem of organizing collective punishment, while you are saying that intuitions of right and wrong arose as ways to break the tie, so to speak, in the side-taking game. Is this right?
First of all, thanks for the comment as well as the kind words about the book and the idea. Much appreciated. Your analysis here seems right to me. I’m skeptical of the idea in the Puritans BBS paper you indicate, just as you say. As you know, we open our response by wondering in what way it is cheating to, say, have different supernatural beliefs, for example. As you say, our view is that moral judgment is serving a side-taking function. I like the “break the tie” language, and in the next post in this series, I’ll use examples that try to make that intuition a bit more concrete. For us, punishment is, firstly, a signal. If you and I are going to credibly signal who we are against, we can do so by supporting costs. How much cost is, of course, a trick. In the piece on sports, I tried to lay some groundwork for this, and a few posts are coming that dig in a bit more. But, just to say, you have it right. Moralistic judgment does not seem to us to be aimed at reducing cheating, free riding, or a lack of effort, as we think is shown by evidence for the vast array of moralized actions. (And, of course, non-consequentialism is also a key clue.) Moral judgment is, we suggest, for getting on the same side as everyone else when conflicts emerge. Thanks again for your comment and let me know if I can clarify further!
Hi Rob,
Thanks for these articles. They are very insightful. I also enjoyed your book Why everyone (else) is a Hypocrite. I have read and re-read it many times. I also enjoyed the Hidden Agenda book, which greatly clarified my thinking on (US) politics. Regarding morality, my understanding is that folks like Baumard and Fitouchi say that judgements of right and wrong are really outputs of a cheater detection module. To believe that a person has acted wrongly by taking a specific action is to believe (implicitly) that by taking that action (or by not acting) the person has not kept up their end of (an implicitly-defined) bargain or violated the terms of a contract, with various types of contracts at various social scales being used to explain phenomena like double-effect or punishment meted out by the Puritans, etc (This is described in the preprint by Andre, Fitouchi, Baumard, and I take the Puritans example from your and DeScioli's response to the Fitouchi et al BBS paper.)
Intuitions of wrongness/rightness are one thing; punishment is another. The individual may punish on their own, but it's better to get others involved and if possible turn punishment into a collective action. Moralistic intuitions can serve as a coordination/focal/Schelling point around which to rally a group for this purpose. Such intuitions can solve the coordination problems attendant to turning punishment into a collective enterprise. As you argued in your papers, your and DeScioli's side-taking hypothesis, which is indeed too elegant to not be true, addresses a different selection pressure, that of avoiding even fights where basically everyone ends up losing. So, if I understand this correctly: Baumard et al are saying the moralistic intuitions are there "for free" as outputs of cheater detection (at various social scales: dyadic, coalitional,..) and separate these from the problem of organizing collective punishment, while you are saying that intuitions of right and wrong arose as ways to break the tie, so to speak, in the side-taking game. Is this right?
Cheers,
AS
First of all, thanks for the comment as well as the kind words about the book and the idea. Much appreciated. Your analysis here seems right to me. I’m skeptical of the idea in the Puritans BBS paper you indicate, just as you say. As you know, we open our response by wondering in what way it is cheating to, say, have different supernatural beliefs, for example. As you say, our view is that moral judgment is serving a side-taking function. I like the “break the tie” language, and in the next post in this series, I’ll use examples that try to make that intuition a bit more concrete. For us, punishment is, firstly, a signal. If you and I are going to credibly signal who we are against, we can do so by supporting costs. How much cost is, of course, a trick. In the piece on sports, I tried to lay some groundwork for this, and a few posts are coming that dig in a bit more. But, just to say, you have it right. Moralistic judgment does not seem to us to be aimed at reducing cheating, free riding, or a lack of effort, as we think is shown by evidence for the vast array of moralized actions. (And, of course, non-consequentialism is also a key clue.) Moral judgment is, we suggest, for getting on the same side as everyone else when conflicts emerge. Thanks again for your comment and let me know if I can clarify further!
Thanks so much for your response. I look forward to your upcoming posts and to carrying on the conversation.