2. I'm not sure I understand the logic behind Fincher's expectation that facial inversion effect should dissapear in case of norm-violators. They are seen as object, not as persons, ok, but why is the person/object distinction relevant for the existence of facial inversion effect in the first place? As far as i understand it, it's about disrupting configural processing. Suppose you give me a particular position in a chess game seen from the perspective of White pieces. If you then "invert" the position so that I'm seeing it from the perspective of Black pieces, it may take some time for me to identify it as the *same* position. The person/object distinction is irrelevant here, what matters is your expertise: a chess grandmaster will instantaneously recognize those "two" positions as the same one. An amateur won't. By the way, couldn't the disappearance of the FI effect be explained by the fact that we have more incentive to remember the face of norm-violators so as to avoid them or punish them? Whose face will you remember longer: that one of a serial killer or a billionaire philanthropist?
3. It seems to me that antipathy doesn't necessarily motivate imposing harm on specific other; it also motivates you to simply avoid interacting with specific other (which doesn't necessarily entail imposing harm). You want to avoid norm-violators so as not to get screwed by them.
4. There are people who dislike dogs. Are you claiming that their emotion is of a different kind than "antipathy"?
I had a piece a while ago dealing with the question of why do we feel that is not appropriate to gossip/speak ill of dead people. One could reframe it as: why do we feel less antipathy toward people once they have passed away? My conclusion: dead people are not rivals (any more). Something similar could be said about dogs/pets in general I think. They are selected precisely for their docility (which means: not rivals!). Here, you may find it of interest: https://triangulation.substack.com/p/on-de-mortuis-nil-nisi-bonum Cheers!
Thanks for the very kind words about the books and for your comments! Let me reply, keeping things brief.
1. Thanks for the reminder. I think the evidence from other sources is consistent with the overall argument I’m making, but your comment is an important caveat.
2. In her dissertation, Fincher writes, “We build a theory of perceptual dehumanization, which proposes that individuals do not perceive the targets of retributivist wrath as fully human. We demonstrate that knowledge that an individual is a norm violator leads to attenuation in face-typical processing which, in turn, influences punitive behavior.” So I think Fincher would say that seeing a stimulus as an object (convict) undermines configural processing, while other evidence undermines a familiarity account. I’m in contact with her, so I can ask her reaction to your motivational question. Her dissertation is available online as well, which is nice.
3. I’m not sure I agree with you. It seems to me that the emotion of disgust is an avoidance emotion but antipathy is a harm emotion. No? I make an argument along these lines in my Psychological Bulletin paper back in 2001.
4. Yes, that’s what I think. I don’t like cats but it’s different from the way I don’t like Dallas Cowboys fans. Ok, that’s a bit of a flip example, but I think, yes, even as a dog person, I don’t want cats to be eradicated, harmed, etc.
5. I think that point about dead people is exactly right. If antipathy is to motivate harm, then it makes no sense in the context of dead people since they can’t be harmed any further. Yeah, very interesting idea that resonates with the approach here. Nice!
Thanks Rob. Greatly enjoyed your "Why Everyone else is a Hypocrite" and "Hidden Agenda". Few remarks:
1. I remember that in "Better Angels" Steven Pinker writes that the number of only 15-20% soldiers firing their weapons in WWII is based on dubious study. Wiki confirms the controversy: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S.L.A._Marshall#Research_methodology
2. I'm not sure I understand the logic behind Fincher's expectation that facial inversion effect should dissapear in case of norm-violators. They are seen as object, not as persons, ok, but why is the person/object distinction relevant for the existence of facial inversion effect in the first place? As far as i understand it, it's about disrupting configural processing. Suppose you give me a particular position in a chess game seen from the perspective of White pieces. If you then "invert" the position so that I'm seeing it from the perspective of Black pieces, it may take some time for me to identify it as the *same* position. The person/object distinction is irrelevant here, what matters is your expertise: a chess grandmaster will instantaneously recognize those "two" positions as the same one. An amateur won't. By the way, couldn't the disappearance of the FI effect be explained by the fact that we have more incentive to remember the face of norm-violators so as to avoid them or punish them? Whose face will you remember longer: that one of a serial killer or a billionaire philanthropist?
3. It seems to me that antipathy doesn't necessarily motivate imposing harm on specific other; it also motivates you to simply avoid interacting with specific other (which doesn't necessarily entail imposing harm). You want to avoid norm-violators so as not to get screwed by them.
4. There are people who dislike dogs. Are you claiming that their emotion is of a different kind than "antipathy"?
I had a piece a while ago dealing with the question of why do we feel that is not appropriate to gossip/speak ill of dead people. One could reframe it as: why do we feel less antipathy toward people once they have passed away? My conclusion: dead people are not rivals (any more). Something similar could be said about dogs/pets in general I think. They are selected precisely for their docility (which means: not rivals!). Here, you may find it of interest: https://triangulation.substack.com/p/on-de-mortuis-nil-nisi-bonum Cheers!
Thanks for the very kind words about the books and for your comments! Let me reply, keeping things brief.
1. Thanks for the reminder. I think the evidence from other sources is consistent with the overall argument I’m making, but your comment is an important caveat.
2. In her dissertation, Fincher writes, “We build a theory of perceptual dehumanization, which proposes that individuals do not perceive the targets of retributivist wrath as fully human. We demonstrate that knowledge that an individual is a norm violator leads to attenuation in face-typical processing which, in turn, influences punitive behavior.” So I think Fincher would say that seeing a stimulus as an object (convict) undermines configural processing, while other evidence undermines a familiarity account. I’m in contact with her, so I can ask her reaction to your motivational question. Her dissertation is available online as well, which is nice.
3. I’m not sure I agree with you. It seems to me that the emotion of disgust is an avoidance emotion but antipathy is a harm emotion. No? I make an argument along these lines in my Psychological Bulletin paper back in 2001.
4. Yes, that’s what I think. I don’t like cats but it’s different from the way I don’t like Dallas Cowboys fans. Ok, that’s a bit of a flip example, but I think, yes, even as a dog person, I don’t want cats to be eradicated, harmed, etc.
5. I think that point about dead people is exactly right. If antipathy is to motivate harm, then it makes no sense in the context of dead people since they can’t be harmed any further. Yeah, very interesting idea that resonates with the approach here. Nice!