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I still belive that "Maybe you can’t eat a mango on a Wednesday with a full moon. Maybe you must do so. The [evolution] view says [one must be the] equilibria [more suited for a given environment]" so that "strange equilibria are moral fossils".

That said, I must confess this is the most mind-opening pieces I ever read about psychology: I must thank you very much, dr. Kurzban.

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Thank you for the comment and the kind words!

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Handing off the responsibility for judging acts to an inherent moral cause puts the emphasis on the act, rather than the individual, and avoids coming off as an insult or attack. That, in itself, is an anti-fight equilibrium. Complex codes of morality and general rules exist for this purpose - hate the game, nto the player.

https://argomend.substack.com/p/the-totalitarian-organizing-principle

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Thanks for the comment. I agree that this sort of view helps to explain how people can avoid cycles of revenge, which is potentially a significant adaptive problem.

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Really appreciate the article. I did have trouble imagining scenario 1 though. In particular, how there could be friendship without some sense of morality. What would friendship mean if there wasn't a right and wrong way to treat your friends that is different than how you would treat others? Maybe the scenario is where they just have morality within the in group; something like the concept of honor among theives.

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Thanks for the comment. My view is that Scenario 1 is observed in non-human animals in which there are alliances or coalitions. I have in mind baboons, chimps, dolphins, etc. In those species, my view is that there is no moral judgment. But there are alliances, which are, in effect, friendships. The key feature is that in such species, individuals choose sides based on who is their closest friend, not the actions of the participants (as in the third scenario).

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