Nice essay! Looking forward to reading Part II and more. I do cognitive science research on exactly this topic. I tend to distinguish ownership intuitions/beliefs from property rights. By and large property rights are formalised ownership intuitions, but they don't necessarily overlap 100%. The legal system serves a specific function in society and defines property rights in domains that intuitions don't need to cover, such as highly technical areas in, say, company law.
Thanks for the comment and the kind words! I think that distinction makes a lot of sense. I think I would still argue that the formal institutions get their reality—or at least their causal effect—in virtue of the psychology. [I tried to get at this idea in a post about power: https://thelivingfossils.substack.com/p/the-true-meaning-of-power] So, in the case of a tax on the books that people ignore--no one pays and the government doesn’t enforce--there is a sense in which the tax is real but that sense strikes me as limited. Is it illegal to jaywalk in Manhattan? As a formal matter, yes, but it’s “really” not because no one, including the police, believe in the law. Of course, this line of thinking is a justification for exactly the distinction you’re drawing. But to me it says that the final reality of the rule is psychological not formal. Please feel free to reply to links to your work that might be of interest!
Quick postscript – I read your comment on Boyer’s target article in Behavioral and Brain Sciences. I’m very sympathetic to the idea that formal rules act as coordination devices. That view resonates with the overall account of morality that my former student Peter DeScioli and I offer. I tried to develop those ideas here in the series on Coordination. Looking forward to seeing more work. ACES looks like a very cool place to be!
This is well written and I will read the follow-ups and comments as we go along (where the propertarian ideologues already raises their fearful voices, and the isolates seek to randomise perception of the world in alignment with their 'experience' but curiously in-step with trollfarm talking points …. anyways.....).
About the thing in our heads. Morality is not a trait but an outcome of the processes that make us human, or at least Homo sp.. As an outcome it is also in our heads. I guess, perhaps, you will follow this up in the worse to come.
The trait that morality is an outcome of is the worlding urge. A term I have invented to avoid looking for causes of things that are outcomes. Other outcomes in various medias, vectors or contexts are culture, polity, religion, performance, ritual. These outcomes can be inputs to other outcomes of course, it's fractals all the way down. We have an urge to should, morality is one outcome of the urge to world the self and self the world.
I like Robert 'man-the-hunter' Ardrey's use of Petters' _noyaux_ in his second book The Territorial Impulse (1967) for the mess you are about to work through.
Thank you for the comment and the support! I came across Ardrey when I was in graduate school, but sadly I have forgotten much about his ideas. Thanks for the reminder. I will go back and inform myself!
Morality as Cooperation Theory actually makes some compelling arguments about how morality evolved and what purpose it was/is designed to serve. I will also add that a tension often exists between personal self-interest values and more morality-based relational values. Property rights would be the general domain of relational values (and MAC argues as such), but issues surface when there isn't an obvious conclusion because self-interests to lead to motivated reasoning that inevitably leads to the conclusion thar favors one's self-interests. But there has to be enough at stake (also usually in one's head) to act on those self-interests. Otherwise, the costs aren't necessarily worth the benefits.
Well, I have complicated views about the morality as cooperation theory. If you’re interested, I have two pieces in the section called “The Boneyard” [https://thelivingfossils.substack.com/s/the-boneyard] which are thinly disguised critiques of that set of ideas. I lay out my own views on the evolution of moral judgment in the “coordination” series in this Substack. The more scholarly exposition is in this paper: https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2012-17529-001. In short, I am skeptical of that framing, but it’s obviously an unsettled area of discussion. Thanks for the comment!
I've been following the co-ordination conversation with interest. It nicely deals with co-operation-as-an-explanation mis-hits.
But why do we should that X anyways (in this current example x=cooperation)? And how can it be that we can should that onto others?
At least feel we should, in a constructive world-building way ?
I argue that this 'shouldiness' can be selected for in evolution, and not an outcome like morality, or cooperation, and that it requires empathy for which the emotional bottleneck is coming to terms with what Freud called the reality principle, and the forestalling out of incipient narcissism. (lacking that ability cannot be recovered from of course).
Yes. The 'world' is a type of insurance society, through time as much as in other local outcomes: like polities/religions/culture. And as such 'morality' as a form/s of co-operation methods (theorised as 'evolving' it's more a set of emotion-laden memes) is a subtype of various ways to world (why we feel we should should and thus should on others)(that's the trait, it has no name generally accepted so I call this shouldy should the worlding urge). It is a trait with no name.
The tension and lack of obvious conclusion you mention is a key feature not a bug.
I call it Janus dancing the necker cubes all the way down. The threshold is where we do that jig: our ability to self the world among others worlding the self. (The individual/s and collective/s are only bits of the world (which is neither individualistic collectives nor collectivised individuals , nor both), and we each and together are but transitionary vectors of the world, which like the 'self' do not exist as objects. They are but things (meetings make us human not outcomes like morality) in our heads we too often reify, and thus deify in our own image.
Property rights of the individual were enshrined in the Constitution as the most important of all rights. A free and prosperous society is impossible without strong individual property rights. Efforts to weaken individual property rights will result only in chaos and a nihilistic downward spiral.
Thanks for the comment. Scholars might differ on what the most important of all rights might be. The right to vote? Speech? Certainly property is up there and I agree about the role of property rights for freedom and prosperity. I showed my hand on this issue a bit in the last chapter of Why Everyone (Else) is a Hypocrite.
A fair and reasoned reply. Rare on social media. I would equate the right to exist and defend one's self as equal in importance to private property rights. If you do not have the right to secure food, shelter, etc. you do not have the ability to exist. But there are always grey areas of course.
That there are no right answers is wrong. Only in the state of nature does might make right. A civilized society requires a minimum level of reciprocity. That mandatory minimum to enable thriving generally is what is called rights. Natural rights are the logical extension of the right to do anything which is not harmful to another creature. Human rights are that no one has the right to harm you.
Thanks for the remark. I probably should have been a bit more careful with my language here. The word “right” can mean both morally right and factually correct. So I used a word that has two meanings, clouding the distinction I was after. I might say that there is a factually true answer to the question about protons but there is not a factually true answer to the question about ownership. That might have been more clear.
If you win in court, if you snooze mooze the authorities, if you hire hitmen to bomb foreign countries and you are more intelligent -- you can convince people you are correct. Objectively, the claim to something is as good as the shared belief gained amongst members of your own tribe. Cooperation is necessary because of the co-dependent nature of humans. Humans with more authority through less laziness, more desire for power and an ability to exercise that power because of the inaction/stupidity of others have more ''rights'' intrinsically.
Humans do not like accountability or responsibility. Property rights are ''not'' protected below 85 IQ or so and everything is considered ''shared''. Might is right in the animal kingdom; if you can control it, you own it.
Nice essay! Looking forward to reading Part II and more. I do cognitive science research on exactly this topic. I tend to distinguish ownership intuitions/beliefs from property rights. By and large property rights are formalised ownership intuitions, but they don't necessarily overlap 100%. The legal system serves a specific function in society and defines property rights in domains that intuitions don't need to cover, such as highly technical areas in, say, company law.
Thanks for the comment and the kind words! I think that distinction makes a lot of sense. I think I would still argue that the formal institutions get their reality—or at least their causal effect—in virtue of the psychology. [I tried to get at this idea in a post about power: https://thelivingfossils.substack.com/p/the-true-meaning-of-power] So, in the case of a tax on the books that people ignore--no one pays and the government doesn’t enforce--there is a sense in which the tax is real but that sense strikes me as limited. Is it illegal to jaywalk in Manhattan? As a formal matter, yes, but it’s “really” not because no one, including the police, believe in the law. Of course, this line of thinking is a justification for exactly the distinction you’re drawing. But to me it says that the final reality of the rule is psychological not formal. Please feel free to reply to links to your work that might be of interest!
Quick postscript – I read your comment on Boyer’s target article in Behavioral and Brain Sciences. I’m very sympathetic to the idea that formal rules act as coordination devices. That view resonates with the overall account of morality that my former student Peter DeScioli and I offer. I tried to develop those ideas here in the series on Coordination. Looking forward to seeing more work. ACES looks like a very cool place to be!
thanks!
This is well written and I will read the follow-ups and comments as we go along (where the propertarian ideologues already raises their fearful voices, and the isolates seek to randomise perception of the world in alignment with their 'experience' but curiously in-step with trollfarm talking points …. anyways.....).
About the thing in our heads. Morality is not a trait but an outcome of the processes that make us human, or at least Homo sp.. As an outcome it is also in our heads. I guess, perhaps, you will follow this up in the worse to come.
The trait that morality is an outcome of is the worlding urge. A term I have invented to avoid looking for causes of things that are outcomes. Other outcomes in various medias, vectors or contexts are culture, polity, religion, performance, ritual. These outcomes can be inputs to other outcomes of course, it's fractals all the way down. We have an urge to should, morality is one outcome of the urge to world the self and self the world.
I like Robert 'man-the-hunter' Ardrey's use of Petters' _noyaux_ in his second book The Territorial Impulse (1967) for the mess you are about to work through.
https://whyweshould.substack.com/p/robert-ardreys-the-territorial-imperative
I support your endeavours.
Thank you for the comment and the support! I came across Ardrey when I was in graduate school, but sadly I have forgotten much about his ideas. Thanks for the reminder. I will go back and inform myself!
Morality as Cooperation Theory actually makes some compelling arguments about how morality evolved and what purpose it was/is designed to serve. I will also add that a tension often exists between personal self-interest values and more morality-based relational values. Property rights would be the general domain of relational values (and MAC argues as such), but issues surface when there isn't an obvious conclusion because self-interests to lead to motivated reasoning that inevitably leads to the conclusion thar favors one's self-interests. But there has to be enough at stake (also usually in one's head) to act on those self-interests. Otherwise, the costs aren't necessarily worth the benefits.
Well, I have complicated views about the morality as cooperation theory. If you’re interested, I have two pieces in the section called “The Boneyard” [https://thelivingfossils.substack.com/s/the-boneyard] which are thinly disguised critiques of that set of ideas. I lay out my own views on the evolution of moral judgment in the “coordination” series in this Substack. The more scholarly exposition is in this paper: https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2012-17529-001. In short, I am skeptical of that framing, but it’s obviously an unsettled area of discussion. Thanks for the comment!
I've been following the co-ordination conversation with interest. It nicely deals with co-operation-as-an-explanation mis-hits.
But why do we should that X anyways (in this current example x=cooperation)? And how can it be that we can should that onto others?
At least feel we should, in a constructive world-building way ?
I argue that this 'shouldiness' can be selected for in evolution, and not an outcome like morality, or cooperation, and that it requires empathy for which the emotional bottleneck is coming to terms with what Freud called the reality principle, and the forestalling out of incipient narcissism. (lacking that ability cannot be recovered from of course).
We can't see the water we swim in.
Yes. The 'world' is a type of insurance society, through time as much as in other local outcomes: like polities/religions/culture. And as such 'morality' as a form/s of co-operation methods (theorised as 'evolving' it's more a set of emotion-laden memes) is a subtype of various ways to world (why we feel we should should and thus should on others)(that's the trait, it has no name generally accepted so I call this shouldy should the worlding urge). It is a trait with no name.
The tension and lack of obvious conclusion you mention is a key feature not a bug.
I call it Janus dancing the necker cubes all the way down. The threshold is where we do that jig: our ability to self the world among others worlding the self. (The individual/s and collective/s are only bits of the world (which is neither individualistic collectives nor collectivised individuals , nor both), and we each and together are but transitionary vectors of the world, which like the 'self' do not exist as objects. They are but things (meetings make us human not outcomes like morality) in our heads we too often reify, and thus deify in our own image.
In less poetic language see this introduction discussion: https://www.academia.edu/41810868/THE_EVOLUTION_OF_MORAL_WISDOM_WHAT_SOME_ETHICISTS_MIGHT_LEARN_FROM_SOME_EVOLUTIONARY_ANTHROPOLOGISTS_2018
my recent reaction to Berkman at https://whyweshould.substack.com/p/reaction-to-john-berkmans-2016-the
I'm keep a list of them at https://whyweshould.loofs-samorzewski.com/reactions-to-papers-on-evolution~morality/
Property rights of the individual were enshrined in the Constitution as the most important of all rights. A free and prosperous society is impossible without strong individual property rights. Efforts to weaken individual property rights will result only in chaos and a nihilistic downward spiral.
Thanks for the comment. Scholars might differ on what the most important of all rights might be. The right to vote? Speech? Certainly property is up there and I agree about the role of property rights for freedom and prosperity. I showed my hand on this issue a bit in the last chapter of Why Everyone (Else) is a Hypocrite.
A fair and reasoned reply. Rare on social media. I would equate the right to exist and defend one's self as equal in importance to private property rights. If you do not have the right to secure food, shelter, etc. you do not have the ability to exist. But there are always grey areas of course.
Good piece. It ties in a lot to some of the issues I write about as well, though my stuff isn't specific to property rights.
That there are no right answers is wrong. Only in the state of nature does might make right. A civilized society requires a minimum level of reciprocity. That mandatory minimum to enable thriving generally is what is called rights. Natural rights are the logical extension of the right to do anything which is not harmful to another creature. Human rights are that no one has the right to harm you.
Thanks for the remark. I probably should have been a bit more careful with my language here. The word “right” can mean both morally right and factually correct. So I used a word that has two meanings, clouding the distinction I was after. I might say that there is a factually true answer to the question about protons but there is not a factually true answer to the question about ownership. That might have been more clear.
Ownership is certainty of access and control, and must be understood as three independent things; ethical, legal, and actual.
There are no property rights.
If you win in court, if you snooze mooze the authorities, if you hire hitmen to bomb foreign countries and you are more intelligent -- you can convince people you are correct. Objectively, the claim to something is as good as the shared belief gained amongst members of your own tribe. Cooperation is necessary because of the co-dependent nature of humans. Humans with more authority through less laziness, more desire for power and an ability to exercise that power because of the inaction/stupidity of others have more ''rights'' intrinsically.
Humans do not like accountability or responsibility. Property rights are ''not'' protected below 85 IQ or so and everything is considered ''shared''. Might is right in the animal kingdom; if you can control it, you own it.